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$ODVGDLU&RFKUDQH5REHUW*DUQHUDQG6LREKDQ2·6XOOLYDQ 
Animal Ethics and the Political 
(forthcoming in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy) 
Some of the most important recent contributions to normative debates concerning our 
obligations to nonhuman animals appear to be somehow ¶SROLWLFDO·.i  Certainly, many of those 
contributions have come from those working in the field of political, rather than moral, 
philosophy.  Furthermore, many of them also explicitly employ political language, concepts and 
ideas when making their prescriptions. For example, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) 
have offered a model of animal rights centred around citizenship, sovereignty and denizenship. 
Martha Nussbaum (2006) has critiqued Rawlsian models of justice for excluding animals, and has 
argued that her capabilities approach provides an appropriate framework to outline our political 
relations with animals. Furthermore, Robert Garner (2013) has recently developed a theory of 
justice for animals that attempts to avoid idealistic utopian theorising and which is instead 
grounded in non-ideal theory.  Still other theories have asked how ideas and debates familiar 
within political philosophy - including the scope of the liberal state (Smith 2012, Flanders 2014), 
the value of equality 2·6XOOLYDQ , human rights (Cochrane 2013a), cosmopolitanism 
(Cooke 2014), global justice (Horta 2013), property rights (Hadley 2015), associative duties 
(Valentini 2014) and democratic representation (Driessen 2014, Garner forthcoming) - shape our 
obligations to nonhuman animals.   
In light of these contributions, some thinkers have claimed that we are witnessing a 
¶SROLWLFDOWXUQ·LQDQLPDOHWKLFV (Milligan 2015a, 2015b, Wissenburg and Scholsberg 2014, Wykoff 
2014, Donaldson and Kymlicka forthcoming*DUQHUDQG2·6XOOLYDQIRUWKFRPLQJ:RRGKDOODQG
Garmendia da Trindade forthcoming).  But do these various contributions represent a real and 
meaningful shift in emphasis from previous work in animal ethics?  In order for them to 
FRPSULVHDJHQXLQH¶SROLWLFDOWXUQ·ZHSURSRVHWKDWtwo things would need to be shown.   First, 
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it would need to be demonstrated that the combined body of work has some unifying thread.  That 
is to say, the contributions should possess common features of some sort, such as shared 
assumptions, normative commitments, methods or approaches.  This is not to say that the 
contributions and their normative prescriptions cannot differ in important and substantial ways; 
LWLVVLPSO\WRSRLQWRXWWKDWIRUWKHPWRFRPSULVHDFRKHVLYH¶WXUQ·LQDQLPDOHWKLFVUDWKHUWKDQ
simply amount to a collection of new but quite disparate theories, they must have some shared 
political feature or set of features which unite them.  Second, for these contributions to mark a 
political turn, they would also have to be shown to be distinctive in some politically salient way 
from what we might cDOO¶WUDGLWLRQDODQLPDOHWKLFV·DILHOGwhich is most famously exemplified by 
the work of Peter Singer (1990) and Tom Regan (2004).   
At first blush, it might seem obvious that the theories and contributions referred to 
above do represent something that is both unified and distinctive. After all, as noted, they all 
employ political language and concepts in making their normative claims about our obligations 
to animals.  However, if the use of political language and concepts was all that were required to 
PDNHDFRQWULEXWLRQWRDQLPDOHWKLFV ¶SROLWLFDO· WKHQZHFRXOGVDIHO\VD\WKDWDQLPDOHWKLFVKDV
been political since its inception.  Donaldson and Kymlicka (forthcoming) have argued that 
animal HWKLFLVWV KDYH WKHRULVHG WKH ¶«Poral rights of animals without drawing upon the 
categories and concepts RISROLWLFDO WKHRU\·. But the truth is that the use of political categories 
and concepts has in fact been pervasive in the literature.  To take just one obvious example: 
many argue quite reasonably that the very notion of ¶rights· is political, since rights imply 
entitlements that can be coercively enforced by the state as a matter of justice (Nozick 1980, pp. 
499-503, Steiner 2005, p. 460).  And of course the concept of rights is an established feature of 
traditional theories of animal ethics: it is most obviously central LQ5HJDQ·VThe Case for Animal 
Rights (2004), but it is also evident LQ6LQJHU·V utilitarian animal manifesto, Animal Liberation, in 
which he describes rights as a, ¶convenient SROLWLFDO VKRUWKDQG· (1990, p. 8). Given the 
widespread use of political language in the animal ethics literature, of which we will provide more 
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examples below, we argue that if these more recent political contributions to the field are to be 
regarded as unified and distinctive, a more specific and substantive essential feature needs to be 
identified.   
This paper, then, is devoted to exploring whether any such unifying and distinctive 
feature exists. We take as our starting point certain characteristics discussed by Tony Milligan, 
ZKLFKKHGHVFULEHVDV¶RYHUODSSLQJFRPPLWPHQWV·RIWKHSROLWLFDOWXUQ (2015a, p. 155, 2015b, p. 
7).ii  Three of the commitments Milligan identifies can be dispensed with relatively quickly on the 
basis that they straightforwardly fail to meet the conditions of being unifying and distinctive.  
They comprise: a focus on the tension between the treatment of animals and liberal values; a 
commitment to interest-based rights; and consideration of animal interests as part of the 
common good. A focus on the tension between liberal values and the treatment of animals is not 
unifying, and is barely discussed in key recent political texts, such as Zoopolis (2011).  That feature 
is also not particularly distinctive, with Tom Regan devoting an entire section of The Case for 
Animal Rights to the issue of how our obligations to animals, and in particular our duty to be 
vegetarian, conflict with the human interest in liberty (2004, pp. 331-334, see also Clark 1987).  A 
commitment to interest-based rights is also not unifying, with only a few recent political texts 
explicitly invoking them (Cochrane 2012).  Furthermore, nor is such a commitment distinctive 
since the use of interest-based rights has an extremely long history in animal ethics (Feinberg 
1974).  Finally, consideration of animal interests as part of the common good cannot be regarded 
as unifying.iii  In fact, it is only explicitly referred to in one recent work, Donaldson and 
Kymlicka·VZoopolis, and even in that theory, the only animals whose interests count as part of 
that common good are domesticated animals (p. 101).   
As such, this paper focuses on the remaining and best candidates for comprising the 
essential feature of the political turn.  Those candidates are: a focus on relations and positive 
duties; the offering of feasible and pragmatic prescriptions; and the avoidance of first principles 
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(Milligan 2015a, p. 155, Milligan 2015b, p. 7).  We find that none of these candidates comprise a 
¶XQLI\LQJWKUHDG·RIWKHSROLWLFDO WXUQ, and are in fact contested by key theorists working in the 
field. We also find that none of these features is particularly distinctive, and each has in fact been 
prevalent in a number of works within traditional animal ethics.  Indeed, on this basis we argue 
that traditional animal ethics should be regarded as more political than some proponents of the 
¶WXUQ· have suggested (for example, Donaldson and Kymlicka forthcoming). 
However, in the final substantive section of the paper, we identify one key focus of these 
recent political contributions which both unifies them, and which makes them important and 
original additions to the normative debate relating to human-animal relations.  That focus is on 
justice. While other theorists (Wykoff 2014) ² including Milligan (2015a, 2015b) - have also 
claimed that these theories offer something novel by their focus on justice, we argue that they 
have not accurately captured what that focus amounts to.  For the crucial unifying and distinctive 
feature of these contributions ² and what can properly be VDLGWRPDUNWKHPRXWDVD ¶SROLWLFDO
WXUQ·- is the way in which they imagine how political institutions, structures and processes might 
be transformed so as to secure justice for both human and nonhuman animals. Put simply, the 
essential feature of the political turn is this constructive focus on justice.  The paper concludes by 
briefly sketching some new areas of enquiry that might be fruitful for future work within the 
political turn ² and most importantly, for just human-animal relations. 
A Focus on Relations and Positive Duties 
The first candidate for a unifying and distinctive feature of the political turn in animal ethics is its 
focus on relations in determining our duties towards animals, and its recognition that some of 
those duties can be positive ones (Milligan 2015a, p. 155, Milligan 2015b, p. 7).  This focus is 
undoubtedly prominent in the literature. For example, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) criticise 
traditional animal ethics for their exclusive focus on the innate capacities of animals.  On their 
view, this leads such theories to ignore the variety of relations we have with different animals, 
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and the differentiated rights ² including positive ones - that those relations generate.  They point 
out that when it comes to delineating our obligations to fellow humans, relationships are 
absolutely crucial: 
Different relationships generate different duties ² duties of care, hospitality, accommodation, 
reciprocity, or remedial justice ² and much of our moral life is an attempt to sort out this 
complex moral landscape, trying to determine which sorts of obligations flow from which types 
of social, political and historical relationships. Our relations with animals are likely to have a 
similar sort of moral complexity, given the enormous variation in our historic relationships with 
different categories of animals (p. 6). 
For Donaldson and Kymlicka, traditional animal ethics has espoused a ¶remarkably flat moral 
landscape, devoid of particularized relationships or obligations· (p. 6). By outlining our duties to 
animals through consideration of our relations with them, they ¶hope to shift the debate about 
animals from an issue in applied ethics to a question of political theory·S. 
 Elizabeth Anderson (2006) agrees, arguing that we need a more differentiated account of 
what is owed to different sorts of animals.  For instance, she claims that while wild animals may 
have negative rights not to be harmed, they lack the kinds of positive rights that can only come 
with membership in a society: ¶An essential commitment of any society is the collective provision 
of goods to its members. The possession of morally significant capacities alone does not make 
one a member of human society, with claims to social provision· S.  Since domesticated 
animals and captives from the wild have been incorporated into human society, she argues that 
they are entitled to positive forms of provision (p. 284). 
 Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) concur with the basic claim that this distinction in our 
relationships with domesticated and wild animals results in a difference in terms of what is owed 
to each; but not only do they flesh out the details of those obligations in much more detail than 
Anderson does, they also consider the implications of additional types of human-animal 
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relationships. )LUVW WKH\DUJXH WKDW ULJKWVRI ¶FLWL]HQVKLS· - to residency, inclusion and agency - 
should be granted to domesticated animals on the basis that they are participating members of 
mixed human-animal communities. Secondly WKH\ DUJXH WKDW ULJKWV RI ¶VRYHUHLJQW\· VKRXOG EH
granted to those wild animals who live outside human communities, on the basis that they are 
competent to and desire to run their own affairs without intervention. And finally, they claim 
WKDWULJKWVRI¶GHQL]HQVKLS·² which fall short of full rights of citizenship -  should be granted to 
WKRVHZLOG¶OLPLQDO
DQLPDOVZKROLYHLQWKHPLGVWRIKXPDQFRPPXQLWLHVRQWKHEDVLVWKDWWKH\
lack the kinds of reciprocal capacities to be regarded as full participants (Chapter 1). 
But this focus on relations and positive duties is neither shared by all who have offered 
political contributions to animal ethics, and nor is it markedly distinctive from previous work in 
animal ethics.  In the first place, the issue of to what extent relations ought to play a part in 
determining our obligations to animals is hotly debated amongst these recent contributions to 
animal ethics. Alasdair Cochrane (2013b), for example, has raised doubts about delineating our 
obligations to animals via such group-based distinctions, proposing a more cosmopolitan 
framework which grants equal concern to all sentient creatures irrespective of their relational 
position.   
Furthermore, there is obviously no compelling reason why a political approach, simply 
E\EHLQJSROLWLFDORXJKWWRDGYRFDWHSRVLWLYHULJKWV)RUH[DPSOH.LPEHUO\6PLWK·V (2012) work 
on how far a liberal state can encroach upon citizens·IUHHGRP in order to protect animals very 
much concentrates on our negative duties towards animals. And indeed, a libertarian political 
theory of animal rights which rejects the very idea of positive rights would seem perfectly 
possible (Milburn forthcoming).  
But the focus on relations and positive rights is also insufficiently distinctive from earlier 
work IRULWWRPDUNWKHHVVHQWLDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIDQ\¶SROLWLFDOWXUQ·LQDQLPDOHWKLFViv Indeed, as 
Donaldson and Kymlicka themselves acknowledge (2011, p. 12), the idea of grounding our 
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obligations to animals in terms of their relational position has a long pedigree in traditional 
animal ethics. For example, Clare Palmer (2010) ² who is not usually associated with the political 
turn - has outlined and defended an account of the different obligations to wild and 
domesticated animals that is remarNDEO\ VLPLODU WR LI PXFK IXOOHU WKDQ (OL]DEHWK $QGHUVRQ·V
theory. Furthermore, Palmer herself was partly inspired by ² and critical of - the relational theory 
of duties to animals offered by the environmental ethicist J. Baird Callicott. Callicott (1989) has 
argued that we each belong to a variety of communities which impose different demands upon 
XV )RUH[DPSOHKHFODLPV WKDWRXUREOLJDWLRQV WRZLOG DQLPDOV LQ WKH ¶ELRWLF FRPPXQLW\· DUH
TXLWHGLIIHUHQWWRWKRVHRZHGWRGRPHVWLFDWHGDQLPDOVLQWKH¶PL[HGFRPPXQLW\·8VLQJWKHVDPH
language, Mary Midgley (1983) has argued that we have ties of kinship with other animals as 
IHOORZPHPEHUVRID¶PL[HGFRPPXQLW\·WKXVLPSRVLQJUHOHYDQWREOLJDWLRQVXSRQXVDVDUHVXOW
But perhaps the most well-known relational theories in animal ethics are those of IHPLQLVW¶FDUH
WKHRULHV· (Donovan and Adams 2007). For example, Nel Noddings (1984, p. 156) has argued that 
what we owe to animals in fact comes down to our personal relationships with animals from 
different species.  
Furthermore, the idea of acknowledging our positive duties towards animals is also 
present within traditional theories of animal ethics.  For example, while %HUQDUG5ROOLQGRHVQ·W
go as far as advocating citizenship for domesticated animals, he does think that those animals are 
members of a social contract with humans, and thus owed membership and certain other positive 
rights as a result (Rollin 2006, p. 54 and p. 298; and on the contract, see also VanDeVeer 1979, 
Elliot 1984, Rowlands 1997, Singer 1988). As such, Rollin uses a political concept in an attempt 
to recognise the legitimate role of domesticated animals as part of our communities. For 
example, in his discussion of pet dogs, Rollin ² in much the same language as Donaldson and 
Kymlicka ² argues that not only are they dependent upon us, but we are dependent upon them. 
He goes on to say that, ¶«it is hard to imagine a more vivid and pervasive example of a social 
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contract, an agreement in nature and action, than that obtaining between humans and dogs· (2006, 
p. 290). When it comes to farm animals, he again asserts that there is no inherent problem with 
their use by humans, so long as the terms of the social contract through which they were first 
domesticated are not broken (2006, p. 397, 2003, p. 5).  
In sum, although it is undoubtedly the case that the contributions of Donaldson and 
Kymlicka, and Anderson, are novel, rich and powerful contributions to the literature, we should 
be wary of thinking that a focus on relations and positive duties is a unifying feature of any 
EURDGHU¶SROLWLFDOWXUQ·LQDQLPDOHWKLFV:e should also be careful not to exaggerate the extent to 
which these approaches have broken away from traditional animal ethics.   
Feasible and Pragmatic Solutions 
A second possible way to characterise the political turn in animal ethics is to claim that it adopts 
a pragmatic attitude towards political engagement and an enhanced understanding of the nature 
of compromise, so often critically important to the political process (Milligan 2015a, p. 156, 
Milligan 2015b, p. 7).  It is easy to see why such a claim would be made; for it does seem that 
political approaches are less idealistic than many of their traditional animal ethics counterparts. 
For example, RobHUW*DUQHU·VZRUNKDVEHHQSDUWLFXODUO\SURPLQHQWLQFULWLTXLQJWKHXWRSLDQLVP
of much animal rights theory and activism. Specifically, Garner (2010) has been critical of the 
abolitionist wing of the animal rights movement (Francione 2008), which claims that we must 
work towards abolishing all ownership and use of sentient animals, and that attempts at 
incremental reform are fundamentally self-defeating as they promote the notion that animals are 
the resources of humans.  Garner is critical of these abolitionist ideas at the level of principle, but 
he also believes that they are IODZHGLQWHUPVRIWKHLUDELOLW\WRDFKLHYHLPSURYHPHQWVLQDQLPDOV·
lives.  Indeed, Garner points out that no society that currently exists, or which is likely to exist in 
the foreseeable future, contains a sizeable population of individuals who think that all animal use 
should be brought to an end.  As such, he argues that abolitionism is practically useless as a 
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strategy, and our efforts should be focused on how we can improve the lives of animals here and 
now.  
Garner takes up the task of offering a theory which does exactly that in his book, A 
Theory of Justice for Animals (2013). Garner employs the distinction in political philosophy between 
ideal and non-ideal theory.  Ideal theory focuses on the validity of a theory of justice or morality 
in relation to how far it is considered to approximate the truth, in as far as normative arguments 
can arrive at such a determinate answer. This is the line traditionally taken by animal ethicists. 
But Garner points out that this is not the only type of theory or criterion of adequacy it is 
possible to adopt. Indeed, non-ideal theory has emerged as a result of increasing frustration by 
many at the discrepancy that is perceived to exist between the abstract normative work of 
political philosophers, in which ideal political and moral principles are advocated, and the 
application of those principles in the non-ideal (real) world (Mills 2005, Farrelly 2007). Non-ideal 
theory argues that our political prescriptions must also be judged in relation to their feasibility: 
that is, how much they are practically possible of achieving at any point. It is this standard that 
Garner employs in his latest theory of human-animal relations. 
But while it is certainly true that elements of this kind of pragmatism exist within many 
of the texts which have been identified as comprising the political turn ² notably in the work of 
6LREKDQ2·6XOOLYDQ (2011) - it is once again neither a unifying nor distinctive characteristic. In 
the first place, *DUQHU·VSUDJPDWLVPLVQRWVKDUHGE\DOOof the recent political contributions to 
normative debates on human-DQLPDOUHODWLRQV)RUH[DPSOH'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFND·VZoopolis, 
with its ambition to assign citizenship, sovereignty and denizenship to animals, is surely properly 
regarded as a work of ideal theory. Indeed, its prescriptions could most accurately be described 
as what Rawls (2001) has called a ¶UHDOLVWLFXWRSLD·, in that they DUH¶SURELQJ the limits of practical 
SROLWLFDOSRVVLELOLW\·² but in this case, in relation to just human-animal relations.   
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Second, many traditional animal ethicists have been pragmatists. Singer, for instance, 
wrote in the second edition of Animal Liberation (1990) WKDW ¶:H DUH PRUH OLNHO\ WR SHUVXDGH
others to share our attitude if we temper our ideals with common sense than if we strive for the 
kind of purity that is more appropriate to a religious dietary law than to an ethical and political 
PRYHPHQW· (p. 233). Another, more sophisticated, attempt to provide an incremental guide has 
been provided by Rollin (2005).  Drawing on the notion of partiality central to the care ethic 
tradition, which was touched upon in the previous section, Rollin notes that partiality to those 
we are close to is a principle that meets with wide public support. As a result, he argues that 
animal advocates should, initially at least, focus on the better treatment of companion animals, 
those with whom humans have close ties of love, friendship and affection, since it is more likely 
WREHDVWUDWHJ\WKDWZLOOPHHWZLWKSXEOLFDSSURYDOWKDQWKH¶KDUGHU·FDVHVRIIDUPDQGODERUDWRU\
animals. 
So while the proposal of feasible and pragmatic prescriptions is certainly evident within 
many recent political contributions to animal ethics, it cannot be described as the essential 
feature of any political turn.  
The Avoidance of First Principles 
A third possible way to characterise the political turn in animal ethics is to claim that it is unified 
and dLVWLQFWLYHLQLWVDYRLGDQFHRI¶ILUVWSULQFLSOHV· (Milligan 2015a, p. 155, Milligan 2015b, p. 7).v 
That is to say, it can be argued that these new contributions to animal ethics offer a set of 
political prescriptions about how we ought to treat animals that do not rely on controversial 
moral foundations.  Such a strategy seems particularly apt to warrant the moniker a ¶political· 
approach to animal ethics, since avoiding first principles has commonly been associated with 
diVWLQFWLYHO\SROLWLFDODSSURDFKHV WRRWKHU ILHOGVRIHWKLFDOHQTXLU\ IURP ¶SROLWLFDO OLEHUDOLVP· WR
¶SROLWLFDOFRQFHSWLRQVRIKXPDQULJKWV· (Rawls 1993, Valentini 2012).  
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One clear example of such an approach comes from Siobhan 2·6XOOLYDQ. In Animals, 
Equality and Democracy (2011)2·6XOOLYDQdeliberately leaves aside arguments concerning the ways 
in which societies unfairly discriminate between humans and animals, the key issue of so much 
ZRUN LQ WUDGLWLRQDO DQLPDO HWKLFV ,QVWHDG 2·6XOOLYDQ·V focus is on how contemporary animal 
welfare regulation discriminates between different types of animals, such as companion and 
agricultural animals. 2·6XOOLYDQDVNVWKDWZHIRFXVRQ¶LQMXVWLFHVWKDWDIIOLFWDQLPDOVDQGDQLPDOV
RQO\· (p. 174) and argues that even if many people believe humans to be superior to animals, 
perhaps we can all agree that the interests of a rabbit in a petting zoo are similar to the interests 
RI D UDEELW LQ D UHVHDUFK ODERUDWRU\ $V VXFK 2·6XOOLYDQ·V VWDUWLQJ SRLQW LV QRW D FODLP DERXW
aniPDOV·LQKHUHQWPRUDOZRUWKRUDQ\RWKHUIRXQGDWLRQDOFRPPLWPHQW5DWKHULWLVWKHSULQFLSOH
of equal consideration and hence the injustice of discriminating between animals with the same 
capacities and interests.  
Likewise, in his recent book, Animal Property Rights (2015), John Hadley does not make 
the case for assigning habitat rights to wild animals on the basis of their innate moral capacities 
DQGZRUWK,QVWHDGKHDLPVWR¶«SUHVHQWDVFUHGLEOHFDVHDVSRVVLEOHIRUILWWLQJDQLPDOVLQWRWKe 
existing property rights mold· (pp. 3-4).  $VVXFKLQWKHVDPHYDLQDV2·6XOOLYDQ+DGOH\DVNVXV
to rethink what we owe to animals on the basis of principles and institutional arrangements that 
we already accept, rather than on the basis of controversial claims DERXWDQLPDOV·PRUDOZRUWK  
Other recent political contributions to animal ethics have eschewed foundational 
DUJXPHQWV DERXW DQLPDOV· PRUDO ZRUWK E\ H[SORULQJ WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI 5DZOVLDQ SROLWLFDO
liberalism for our obligations to animals.  For example, Kimberly Smith in, Governing Animals 
(2012), DLPVWREXLOGDQDFFRXQWRIDQLPDOHQWLWOHPHQWVEDVHGRQWKHH[LVWLQJ¶VRFLDOFRQVHQVXV·
amongst Americans about the status of animals, rather than any metaphysical claims about their 
inherent worth (p. xiv).  In the same spirit, Chad Flanders (2014) argues that the liberal principles 
informing public reason constrain the values that might be evoked in debates about animals. In 
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SDUWLFXODU KH FODLPV WKDW ¶WKH SUHVHQW FRQVHQVXV RQ DQLPDO ULJKWV FDQQRW VXVWDLQ D public 
GLVFRXUVH WKDW EDVHV LWVHOI RQ DQLPDO ULJKWV RU WKH LQWULQVLF ZRUWK RI DQLPDOV· (p. 56). For 
Flanders, public reason is a matter of existing consensus, and while there is no consensus on the 
rights of animals, there is some on the role of the state in regulating animal welfare.  
However, the avoidance of first principles is not a good basis to characterise any new 
political turn because, once again, it is neither a unifying feature of recent contributions which 
are usually regarded as political, nor is it distinctive from previous work in animal ethics.  For 
example, some of the paradigm examples of political contributions to animal ethics are grounded 
explicitly in foundational claims about the moral worth of animals. Indeed, Donaldson and 
Kymlicka (2011, Chapter 2) advocate a set of universal moral rights for all sentient animals which 
provides the moral bedrock of their Zoopolis.  These are the rights that all sentient creatures 
possess, irrespective of whether they are citizens, denizens, or members of wild animals 
sovereign communities. Furthermore, such rights do a huge amount of work in the theory, ruling 
out as they do nearly all forms of animal research and agriculture (see also Cochrane 2013a).  
Furthermore, there are also theories within traditional animal ethics that have sought to 
avoid controversial moral foundations.  Rollin (1994), for example, has outlined a theory of 
obligations to animals that aims, in extremely similar ways to those theorists mentioned above, 
not to derive from foundational arguments about the moral worth of animals, but from what 
society already believes.  ThLVLVZKDW5ROOLQKDVFDOOHGWKH¶QHZVRFLDOHWKLF·IRUDQLPDOV5ROOLQ
FODLPV WKDW D SUHYLRXV ¶FRQVHQVXV HWKLF· SURPXOJDWHG ¶DQWL-FUXHOW\· PHDVXUHV LQ UHODWLRQ WR
animals.  He argues that while this ethic made sense in societies which made of use traditional 
husbandry in animal agriculture, it no longer resonates in an era of industrialised farming, where 
the suffering that animals endure is rarely the result of intentional malicious acts by morally 
deficient individuals.  As such, he claims that contemporDU\VRFLHW\QRZHQGRUVHVD¶QHZVRFLDO
HWKLF· WKDW JRHV EH\RQG ZDQWRQ FUXHOW\  7KDW QHZ VRFLDO HWKLF GHPDQGV ¶«WKDW WKH DQLPDOV·
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basic natures will not be submerged in the course of their being used by humans· (p. 80).  In 
other words, Rollin claims that this new ethic is not a call for the abolition of animal use, but one 
which calls for drives for increased efficiency and productivity to be curtailed by concern for the 
needs and well-being of the animals themselves.  Crucially, in his view, it is this ethic that should 
provide the normative basis of our accounts of what we owe to animals, rather than any 
controversial claims about their inherent worth.   
Once again, then, while many of the recent political contributions to animal ethics do 
avoid first principles, it cannot be described as the essential feature of any political turn. It is 
neither endorsed by all of the recent political contributions to the debate, nor is it particularly 
distinctive from previous work in animal ethics 
A Constructive Focus on Justice 
So far, it has been argued that the use of political concepts, the focus on relations and positive 
rights, the proposal of feasible and pragmatic prescriptions, and the avoidance of first principles 
are not sufficiently shared and not sufficiently distinctive from traditional animals ethics to 
provide the essential feature for any new political turn in animal ethics.  This raises the question: 
has there been any such thing as a political turn in animal ethics?  Or have we simply witnessed a 
disparate bunch of new contributions to animal ethics, which while framed in political language, 
offer little that is truly distinctive from previous normative work on our obligations to animals?  
We wish to argue that there has in fact been a political turn in animal ethics, and that 
there is a unifying thread running through these recent political contributions which marks them 
out as distinctive from previous work in animal ethics.  That unifying thread is a focus on justice.  
But crucially, it is also a specific type of focus on justice.  For we argue that theories which 
comprise the political turn all seek to explore how political institutions, structures and processes 
might be transformed to better serve the interests of animals.  In other words, they outline the 
shape and nature of a community that secures justice for both humans and other animals.  
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Traditional theories of animal ethics have all tended to provide two things: an account of 
the moral status of animals; and an account of our moral obligations to animals. Political 
contributions are somewhat different, we argue, in that their focus is on justice, rather than 
morality (Wissenburg and Scholsberg 2014, pp. 1-5).  Morality is usually considered to be a 
broader concept than justice.  For example, a particular action or way of behaving may be 
immoral, VXFKDVVSHDNLQJXQNLQGO\EHKLQGVRPHRQH·VEDFN but that does not thereby mean that 
such action and behaviour is unjust.  Justice involves an element of compulsion; to behave justly 
LV ¶D UHTXLUHPHQW UDWKHU WKDQDQRSWLRQDOH[WUD· (Campbell 1980, p. 20).  Furthermore, because 
the claims of justice are regarded as so pressing, the obligation to act so as to avoid injustice falls 
most often on the state or other political authority. This is not to say that acts of injustice cannot 
be perpetrated by individuals or by collective entities such as corporations; but it is to say that 
political institutions that are best placed to enforce justice and remedy injustices. Focusing on justice 
in the context of the moral status of animals, then, directs attention away from how we, as 
individuals, ought to regard animals, towards the way in which the state ought to regulate the 
treatment of animals.  It is thus perhaps unsurprising that political theorists working on the 
nature of our obligations to animals have adopted this focus on justice. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that a discourse based on justice is entirely 
absent from traditional animal ethics. Indeed, it is the case that most traditional animal ethicists 
actually assume that their moral theories are also theories of justice; and thus that the state has an 
obligation to act upon them. Regan (2004), for instance, merely assumes that a rights-based 
discourse is identical to one based on justice, and that justice and morality are one and the same 
thing. As a consequence, for Regan, excluding animals as recipients of justice is equivalent to 
depriving them oI DQ\GLUHFWPRUDOZRUWK 7KLV DVVHUWLRQ LV DSSDUHQW IURP 5HJDQ·V LQDFFXUDWH
FULWLTXH RI 5DZOV·V FRQWUDFWDULDQ WKHRU\ RI MXVWLFH 5HJDQ IRU LQVWDQFH UHPDUNV WKDW 5DZOV·s 
FRQWUDFWDULDQLVP¶V\VWHPDWLFDOO\GHQLHVWKDWZHKDYHGLUHFWGXWLHVWRWKRVHKXPDQEHings who do 
not have a sense of justice ² \RXQJFKLOGUHQIRULQVWDQFHDQGPDQ\PHQWDOO\UHWDUGHGKXPDQV·
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as well as animals (Regan 1985, p. 17). In a more recent work, Regan repeats the claim that 
5DZOV·V ¶PRUDO RXWORRN SUHMXGLFLDOO\ H[FOXGHV QRQKXPDQ DQLPDOV IURP GLUHFW PRUDO FRQFHUQ· 
(Cohen and Regan 2001, p. 171). 
5HJDQ·VFRQFHSWXDOFRQIXVLRQGHULYHVIURPKLVDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHUH is no moral realm 
independent of justice where direct duties can be owed to animals. By contrast, Alison Hills 
(2005, p. 93) recognises the distinction between a realm of justice and a realm of morality. As she 
SRLQWVRXWLWLVRQO\LI¶WKHwhole RIHWKLFVLVGHILQHGE\DFRQWUDFW·WKDWDQLPDOVPLJKWEHGHHPHG
to have no moral standing so that we have no direct duties to them. Rawls, by contrast, wants to 
distinguish between ethics and justice, with animals excluded only from the latter. The key point, 
then, is that Regan assumes that his discourse is based on justice as much as it is on morality. For 
him, the two are interchangeable.  We might say, then, that what makes the political turn 
innovative is its focus on justice as distinctive from morality. 
Tony Milligan has also claimed that these recent political approaches share a 
commitment to offering more than an account of our personal obligations relating to reforms in 
lifestyle, consumer behaviour, diet and so on.  He argues that these new political works seek to 
offer specifically political prescriptions.vi Milligan writes: ¶Lobbying for legislative change serves as 
an exemplar of moving beyond lifestyle choices and into the terrain where only a political 
movement can be effective· (2015a, p. 168).  But this is not quite the same focus on justice that 
we have in mind. Milligan seems to believe that these contributions all have the commitment to 
working within existing political structures to achieve reforms that serve the interests of animals.  
But while that may be a part of some political approaches, in general terms this interpretation of 
the turn is too narrow for our purposes. For what makes the political turn both cohesive and 
distinctive is the fact that the theories which comprise it do not just work within existing 
structures, but also ask how those structures might be transformed.  In other words, they reflect 
upon and reimagine our political structures, institutions and processes. And in particular, they 
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consider how those structures, institutions and processes might be transformed to secure justice 
for both humans and animals. 
Jason Wyckoff (2014) is another theorist who has recently claimed that political 
contributions to animal ethics can be distinguished by their focus on justice. But he too misses 
the mark in terms of what that focus amounts to. Wyckoff argues that traditional animal ethics 
has failed to understand that the wrongs suffered by animals are primarily structural, rather than 
the result of cruel behaviour by individuals (p. 539).  He goes on to argue that the institutional 
practices which construct animals as property ² such as WKH ¶UHVRXUFHSDUDGLJP· ² need to be 
overhauled in order for animals to be treated justly (pp. 547-551).  
But while Wyckoff is correct that the political approach is concerned with political 
structures, institutions and processes, he fails to identify what is distinctive and unique about this 
new, emerging scholarship,QGHHGWKHUHDUHWKUHHLPSRUWDQWOLPLWDWLRQVWR:\FNRII·VSDUWLFXODU
characterisation of a political approach focused on justice. First, while analysing how the 
institution of property affects animals is undoubtedly important, it is an issue that is extremely 
well traversed in animal ethics, most notably by Gary Francione (1995; but see also Hauser et al 
eds. 2006) $V VXFK :\FNRII·V WKHRU\ FDQQRW EH VDLG WR H[HPSOLI\ D QHZ ¶WXUQ· WKDW LV
qualitatively distinct from the work of traditional animal ethics.   
Second, offering a critical analysis of existing structures and institutions to diagnose how 
and why animals are mistreated is also far from distinctive.  Indeed, the question of how social 
structures and forces serve to oppress different groups, including animals, is familiar within the 
sociological literature on human-animal relations, amongst ecofeminists, and in critical animal 
studies (Nibert 2002, Adams 2000, Torres 2007).  Furthermore, and finally, while such work is 
clearly valuable, it is important to bear in mind that it is primarily explanatory.  Our claim is that 
what makes the theories comprising the political turn distinctive is that they are constructive and 
normative: that is to say, they go beyond simply analysing existing political structures to explain 
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how and why injustices to animals occur; for they also imagine how our political institutions and 
processes might be transformed for the benefit of human and animals alike.   
)RU H[DPSOH RQH RI WKH SULPDU\ DLPV RI 'RQDOGVRQ DQG .\POLFND·V Zoopolis is to 
reimagine the concepts of citizenship and sovereignty so that they might serve the interests of 
animals. 2QHRI1XVVEDXP·VJRDOVLQFrontiers of Justice (2006), is to ask the basic question of what 
a scheme of social justice that takes the capabilities of sentient animals seriously would look like.  
As we have seen, in A Theory of Justice for Animals (2013), Garner constructs the framework a just 
political order that is socially, politically and economically possible to achieve. And in separate 
works, Smith (2012) and Flanders (2014) have both considered how a state guided by the 
principles of political liberalism ought to govern its relations with animals. In Animals, Equality 
and Democracy 2·6XOOLYDQ does not merely critique contemporary states for their unfair 
discrimination between different types of animal, but also explores how the liberal democratic 
principle of equality may be used to secure justice for all animals.  Cochrane (2013a) has 
reimagined the very idea of human rights to investigate how they might evolve to robustly 
protect the basic interests of animals. Laura Valentini (2014) has explored the implications of 
applying so-FDOOHG ¶DVVRFLDWLYHGXWLHV· WRZDUGVFHUWDin non-human animals.  Steve Cooke (2014) 
has imagined how extending the cosmopolitan duty of hospitality might affect our obligations to 
animals across borders.  In ¶([SDQGLQJ*OREDO-XVWLFH7KH&DVHIRUWKH,QWHUnational Protection 
RI$QLPDOV·Oscar Horta (2013) has explored the shape and nature of an international system of 
animal protection.  Hadley (2015) has reimagined the very conception of property as it might be 
applied to wild animals. Finally, a number of political theorist have recently explored how 
democratic institutions might be reformed so as to better represent the interests and claims of 
animals (Driessen 2014, Garner forthcoming). 
This focus on imagining how our political institutions, structures and processes might be 
transformed so as to secure justice for both human and nonhuman animals is what unifies these 
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various contributions.  And it is also what makes these contributions distinctive from previous 
work in animal ethics, which focused far more on the moral obligations of individuals, or simply 
assumed that personal obligations ought to be enforced by the state.  This constructive focus on 
justice is the essential feature of the political turn in animal ethics.  
Conclusions  
In this paper we have sought to establish whether there has been any coherent and novel 
¶SROLWLFDOWXUQ·LQQRUPDWLYHGHEDWHVFRQFHUQLQJRXUWUHDWPHQWRIDQLPDOV, and what the essential 
feature of such a turn might be.   We have argued that the mere use of political language and 
concepts is insufficient to provide the basis for any new turn on the grounds that such language 
has always been prevalent in the animal ethics literature.  Further, we have claimed that other 
possible characteristics ² such as a focus on relational position and positive duties, feasible and 
pragmatic prescriptions and the avoidance of first principles ² are insufficiently shared amongst 
these contributions and insufficiently distinctive from previous work in animal ethics to 
constitute the essential feature of any new political turn.  Indeed, we have argued that traditional 
animal ethics has been far more political than some thinkers have claimed. 
 Yet we do find that there is something significant that unites these contributions and 
which marks them out as providing something different from previous work in traditional animal 
ethics. That feature is a focus on justice; and more specifically on how our political institutions, 
structures and process might be transformed so as to secure just human-animal relations.  
 To be sure, the political turn in animal ethics is still in its infancy. As such, the research 
potential of the turn has by no means be fully realised. We have provided a flavour of the justice-
focused animal scholarship undertaken to date. Perhaps a pressing concern for political turn 
scholars is consideration of which further institutions, structures and processes might be 
challenged, redefined or reimagined in pursuit of justice for animals. Some of the key questions 
that come to mind include: must just, animal-friendly institutions be bound by the nation-state? 
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What shape and structure would a political economy that served the interests of animals possess? 
What are the political bounds of toleration ² domestically and internationally ² in respect of the 
treatment of animals? How are animals to be properly and meaningfully represented across all of 
our political institutions, structures and processes?  And should those institutions, structures and 
processes be modelled on the ways in which human rights are currently protected domestically 
and internationally, or should they take a very different form?  No doubt these questions, and 
many others, will be pursued as our relations with animals becomes an established and essential 
part of the discipline of political philosophy.     
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i
 From this point on, we follow the convention of using ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĂŶŝŵĂů ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ
more accurate but more ĐƵŵďĞƌƐŽŵĞ ‘ŶŽŶŚƵŵĂŶĂŶŝŵĂů ? ?
ii
 Seven features are referred to in Milligan, Animal Ethics: The Basics, 155; and only five in 
DŝůůŝŐĂŶ ? ?dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdƵƌŶŝŶŶŝŵĂůƐZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ? ? The ones which fail to make the latter list 
ĂƌĞ PƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶŐŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
conceptualisation of the movement as a political (rather than moral) crusade.  
iii
 Note that this is one of the features which does not make iƚŝŶƚŽDŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐůŝƐƚŝŶ ‘dŚĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚƵƌŶŝŶĂŶŝŵĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?. 
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iv
 It is also worth questioning how essential it is to the most significant implications of 
ŽŶĂůĚƐŽŶĂŶĚ<ǇŵůŝĐŬĂ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĨƚĞƌĂůů ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂŶŝŵĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞǇĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ
which will have the most profound impact upon human-animal relations.  For the universal 
rights of animals to life, to not to be tortured and not to be exploited mean that the vast 
majority of domesticated animals will be phased out of existence. 
v
 Milligan puts this claim in slightly different terms.  He argues that the political turn 
 ‘ĚŽǁŶŐƌĂĚĞƐƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
contributions rely less on the claim that animals have an inherent moral value because 
human individuals with similar capacities, such as young infants and the seriously mentally 
disabled, have such value.  But the point is the same: political contributions avoid relying on 
controversial claims about inherent moral value to ground normative prescriptions relating 
to animals.  
vi
 Hence he characterises this overlapping commitment as belief in the view that animal 
rights is a political, as opposed to moral, crusade. 
